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Abstract
When a jazz, rock, or hip-hop drummer strikes certain notes
in each measure slightly late, instead of hearing the degree to
which those notes are late, we typically hear the effects of
those variations; namely, a groove, the "feel" of a rhythm.
Slight variations of pitch function similarly.  In this essay, I
argue that certain analytic theorists go astray due to their
preoccupation with the variations themselves.  By invoking
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's insights into subtle visual perceptions,
and his notion of perceptual indeterminacy, I avoid an account
of musical subtlety suggested by Daniel Dennett that is too
coarse-grained, as well as the bleak conclusion that certain
musical subtleties are ineffable, Diana Raffman's view.  I
conclude that elements of music that are perceived
ambiguously can perform a positive function in such aesthetic
experiences:  they can mediate or foster emergent qualities;
moreover, they must be perceived in this way to do so.
Key words
aesthetic experience, Paul Cézanne, Daniel Dennett,
expressive variation, groove, indeterminacy, ineffability,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, musical nuance, musical subtlety,
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1. Introduction
The active nature of aesthetic experience is emphasized by R.
G. Collingwood, Roman Ingarden, John Dewey, to name a few.
 One way in which aesthetic experiences are active is that they
are exploratory.  For instance, in order to apprehend one
feature of a painting or musical performance, you may need to
direct your attention to other features.  A rock music critic
may write, "The rhythm of this track has an intriguing, frantic
quality; in order to hear this, listen to the way the bass guitar
repeatedly races ahead of the drums." This may be followed by
advice about what not to attend to: "This frantic quality is
difficult to hear; if you focus too much on the keyboard and
voices, you may fail to hear it."  Aesthetic experiences are
often active at least in the sense that we can, and often must,
look and listen to different features of an artwork.  
Here are three of the questions that drive this essay:  What
are the effects of perceptual attention upon what we perceive
in music?  Does a given feature affect other features
differently when we attend—or do not attend—to that feature?
 In cases in which certain features are responsible for
emergent qualities, does perceptual attention upon those
responsible features affect this emergence?  I explore
questions such as these through examples of musical nuances
(a.k.a. "expressive variations"), such as a slightly raised F-
sharp or a slightly early eighth note, and emergent qualities,
such as a harmonic brightness or a groove.  Although I focus
upon music, I believe that some of what I say can be applied
to similar perceptual circumstances in visual art; indeed, I will
draw upon examinations of visual perception and visual
art.           
It is a common methodological starting point in continental
phenomenology to focus upon the phenomena under
consideration as they show up in ordinary experience.  The
alternative, according to phenomenologists, is to allow one
method of investigation or another to illegitimately put its
imprint upon the subject matter in the early stages of an
investigation.  In ordinary experiences of musical subtleties,
we hear the effects of musicians' minute manipulations of pitch
and timing rather than the manipulations themselves
(musicians perform such variations, in fact, for the purpose of
our hearing such effects).  For example, a singer may sing a
certain note slightly high; we hear the effect of that variation,
a "brightened" harmony (say), rather than hearing the degree
to which the note is raised.  A jazz, rock, or hip-hop drummer
may strike certain notes in each measure slightly late; we hear
the effect of these manipulations, a groove (the "feel" of a
rhythm), rather than hearing the precise degree to which the
notes are late.  Of course, with practice, one can hear (detect)
these slight variations themselves, but this is not a typical way
to listen.  
In investigating musical subtleties, many psychologists, music
theorists, and philosophers focus on the slight variations
themselves, often upon our abilities to detect or to
discriminate between them.  In contrast to this, in order to
offer an account of the musical subtleties we typically hear, the
effects of slight variations, I draw upon Maurice Merleau-
Ponty's insights into subtle visual perceptions, such as his use
of the figure-ground structure of perception and his notion of
perceptual indeterminacy.  I aim to avoid an account of
musical subtleties that is too coarse-grained (which would
emerge from an approach suggested by Daniel Dennett), as
well as to avoid the bleak conclusion that certain musical
subtleties are ineffable (Diana Raffman's conclusion); Dennett's
and Raffman's views ultimately result from focusing upon the
variations themselves rather than their effects.  Although these
terms and relations must be clarified below, I will claim that
elements of music indeterminately perceived perform a
positive function insofar as they mediate emergent qualities;
they only do this as indeterminate, i.e., when they are
preserved as ambiguous in perception.
2. Daniel Dennett's E-string
Daniel Dennett has suggested that some perceptions which, at
first, seem ineffable turn out not to be once they are analyzed
effectively.  In his "Quining Qualia,"[1] he considers the sound
of a guitar's low, open E-string, through a three-step thought
experiment.  He begins by asking us to imagine simply
plucking the string.  The sound seems rich, ineffable and
unanalyzable.  His method, reasonably enough, is to attempt
to break-up the sound into parts. Thus, next, we are asked to
play the string's harmonic (by placing a finger lightly on the
twelfth fret while plucking). Upon hearing this harmonic,
"Suddenly a new sound is heard:  'purer' somehow and of
course an octave higher."[2] According to Dennett, we have
now isolated one of the original sound's seemingly ineffable
characteristics, the harmonic overtones.  Finally, Dennett
believes that when we listen to the open E again, after hearing
the harmonic, we will be able to clearly perceive the overtones
of the sound, which will render the composite sound that much
less ineffable:  "On a third open plucking one can hear, with
surprising distinctness, the harmonic overtone that was
isolated in the second plucking.  The homogeneity and
ineffability of the first experience is gone, replaced by a duality
as 'directly apprehensible' and clearly describable as that of
any chord."[3]            
The analysis Dennett leads us through is misleading:  rather
than simply clarifying the original perception, his instructions
lead us to a different perception.  Dennett himself describes
the third perception as being different (in the third perception
the overtones are more distinct).  He does not seem to realize
that in the different steps of his experiment we are listening to
the E-string in different ways—and when we do, a change in
the structure of the perception occurs. Invoking the early
Gestalt psychologists, in his Phenomenology of Perception,[4]
Merleau-Ponty maintains that in order to correctly describe
perceptions we must describe them in terms of the figure-
ground structure (the figure consists of the area to which one
attends; the ground consists of the other portions of the visual
field):  "a figure against a background is the most basic
sensible given we can have. . . .  The perceptual 'something' is
always in the middle of some other thing" (PoP, p. 4).
 Merleau-Ponty explores the relationship between perceptual
attention and perceptual structure by considering a Necker
Cube (figure 1). Regarding the labeled cube, he writes, "When
I focus upon the face ABCD of the cube, this does not mean
simply that I make it enter into a state of being clearly seen,
but also that I make it count as a figure, and as closer to me
than the other face; in short, I organize the cube" (PoP, p.
275).
Figure 1: Necker Cube
Focusing upon different parts of the cube changes the
structure of the perception.  Failing to describe that structure
accurately leads to a misdescription of the perception.  These
structural changes also affect other aspects of a perception: in
this case, what we take to be the figure determines whether
we see the cube as from below or above.  We wouldn't say
that these different perceptions of the cube are the
same.           
Returning to Dennett, he believes that the third perception of
the E-string is similar enough to the first perception that the
third is simply a clarification the first; this is his mistake. He
doesn't seem to realize that focusing upon different features of
the stimulus changes the structure of what we perceive.  In
the first hearing of the E-string, the overtones were not the
focus of attention (this is the typical perception, in the sense
mentioned in my introduction); however, hot on the heels of
the isolated perception of the harmonic (the second hearing),
in the third hearing, the overtones are the focus, they are the
figure.  Thus, Dennett's analysis does not merely clarify the
first perception; rather, the analysis results in a different
perception; it generates a different perceptual structure in
which the overtones become the figure.  He does not render
the first perception effable.  The third perception can be
described as clearer than the first but that is not all that
distinguishes it from the first.  
The important point for our purposes is that the perceptions
are different, and this difference can be fruitfully characterized
in terms of different ways of perceiving the E-string sound, a
different perceptual structure.  What Dennett takes himself to
be doing is clarifying an aspect of the experience (the
overtones), which have been there all along.  And he assumes
that there is no difference between an experience in which the
overtones remain unnoticed and the experience in which they
are noticed.  We will see that when more specifiable effects of
such subtleties are involved, in actual music, this seemingly
minor difference between experiences becomes crucial.
3. Subtleties of pitch and duration
An instrumentalist or vocalist may perform certain notes that
are slightly high or slightly low; two such notes may be
accurately categorized as A-sharps while one is slightly higher
than the other (but not high enough to be categorized in terms
of the next highest pitch concept). Regarding duration, a
drummer, vocalist, or pianist, may perform slightly early or
late notes.  Like the pitch examples, this earliness or lateness
is not characterizable by means of music-theoretic concepts,
such as eighth note, sixteenth note, or dotted sixteenth note.
 Two notes exhibiting a timing subtlety may be accurately
categorized as eighth notes while one is performed slightly
later.  Diana Raffman calls these subtleties "musical
nuances";[5] psychologists and music theorists prefer
"expressive variations."           
Importantly, philosophers, psychologists, and music theorists
who examine these musical subtleties typically do so by
characterizing them in the figure role (this is not to take the
typical musical experience to be the target of investigation).
We can see that this is the case by recalling that focusing upon
a pitch or duration places it in the figure role; it is common in
the relevant articles on music perception to find subjects being
asked to attend to pitches or durations in order to report on
which variations they are able to detect, or to discriminate
between.  For example, in Eric F. Clarke's "The Perception of
Expressive Timing in Music," he writes, "The experiments
reported in this paper are an attempt to investigate the ability
of listeners to detect small-scale timing changes, similar to
those in expressive performance, in various kinds of musical
sequence."[6]  Raffman adopts this orientation by following
such research:
In hearing these nuances, we are hearing
differences within—that is, more fine-grained
than—the C-pitch [chromatic pitch] and C-
interval (chromatic interval) categories.  Each C-
pitch category subsumes many discriminably
different pitches, just as each "determinable"
color category subsumes many different
"determinate" shades; there are many A-naturals
and many B-flats, just as there are many reds
and many blues. Under laboratory conditions of
minimal uncertainty, the human ear can
discriminate anywhere from 20 to 300 pitches to
the semitone, depending upon the frequency
range and testing procedure employed.[7]
Raffman uses pitch terms with subscripts to denote specific
pitches; this also indicates that she is characterizing variations
as occupying the figure role:  a slightly high F-sharp is an "F-
sharp(2)," "F-sharp(4)," and so on.  She claims that such
terms accurately characterize these subtleties; the terms
"serve perfectly well for enunciating the [representational]
content in question."[8]  Construing nuances in the figure role
sets the stage for her resulting observation that nuances are
ineffable.  Once these subtleties are conceived as in the figure
role, this leads to the observation that our capacities of
discrimination outstrip our capacities of conceptualization.  Just
as we can discriminate or detect many more color shades than
we can conceptualize, so too, we can discriminate many more
pitches than we can conceptualize.  According to Raffman,
fine-grained pitches are ineffable insofar as we cannot
conceptualize them.[9]
4. Pitch and duration subtleties in the figure-ground
structure
So far, we have seen that Dennett believes that our subtle
perceptions can be clarified conceptually, so they are perfectly
effable; we've considered the mistakes in his approach.[10]
 Raffman believes that discrimination outstrips
conceptualization, and this leads to ineffability.  And as I have
indicated, like Dennett, Raffman does not take the import of
the figure-ground structure into consideration.  The question
to consider now is this:  what is the figure and what is the
ground in a perception of a slightly high pitch? In order to
take the next step, I want to very briefly consider my criticism
of Raffman, from my "Musical Musical Nuance."[11]  
In that essay, I criticize Raffman by highlighting her
descriptions of perceptions of musical nuances.  Although I
don't put it this way in that essay, perceptions of nuances in
the figure role are her explananda.  Without appealing to the
starting point common in phenomenology (describing the
phenomena under consideration as they show up in ordinary
experience), I argue in that essay that the target of an
investigation into these musical subtleties should not be the
slightly high pitches themselves but rather certain effects of
those pitches.  And I am not referring to the effects standardly
mentioned by Raffman, music theorists, and psychologists
writing on such subtleties, namely, that a performer employs a
pitch nuance in order to lead a listener to hear the musical
structure as he, the performer, hears it. Rather, I am referring
to nonstructural effects.  In that essay, I consider a quotation
uncharacteristic of Raffman's book in which she mentions a
nonstructural effect—the "brightening" of an interval (she
subsequently downplays this and other nonstructural effects):
Many fine-grained differences in interval width—
indeed the most interesting and important ones,
for our purposes—are fully intended expressive
features, as when a flutist ever so slightly raises
(“sharpens”) an F-sharp sustained over a D-
natural across a modulation from b minor to D
major. . . . The flutist’s objective is to widen
(“brighten”) the major third between D-natural
and F-sharp, thereby emphasizing and
strengthening the new key of D major.[12]
I suggest in that essay that one reason to prioritize
nonstructural effects is that they constitute one set of reasons
that musicians perform slight variations to begin with.  A
musician strives to perform a slightly high A-natural (say)
because it has an effect in the music, and one kind of effect is
nonstructural, such as a "brightening." I go on to develop one
piece of the puzzle for rendering such effects effable:  we can
employ indirect description, metaphor, and comparisons to
characterize such effects.[13]           
Now, the figure-ground structure is useful in clarifying
subtleties of pitch and timing because it enables us to further
clarify these subtleties, which, importantly, further preempts
the ineffability conclusion. In order to begin to see why, it will
be instructive to consider Raffman's example in terms of
Dennett's three-step analysis. In an initial, typical perception,
the figure is the "brightening" (analogous to the initial, vague
E-string sound); the slightly high pitch is in the background
(analogous to the E-string's overtones).  In the second
perception, we need a way to imagine focusing our attention
toward the slightly high pitch (recall that Dennett
accomplished this by plucking the harmonic).  Imagine that we
are at a rehearsal, and could isolate the flute by simply
walking toward the flutist.  Upon clearly hearing the flute's
slightly high F-sharp, that pitch becomes the figure.  We are
hearing the pitch as slightly high, so let's follow Raffman and
name it, call it an "F-sharp(3)."  In the third perception, we
return to our original position in space, and hear the music
altogether.  However, having been highlighted, the high F-
sharp is still the figure.  Clearly, this is a different structure
from the first perception; it is a different perception; it sounds
different.           
Here is the question I have been working up to:  how should
these initial perceptions be described?  Is there a way to
describe the slightly raised F-sharp while it is in the
background, in the first, typical hearing?  If it is correct that
musicians often perform such subtleties for the very purpose
of generating effects such as a "brightening," then it stands to
reason that a salient kind of musical perception would be
structured so as to hear the "brightening" as the figure.  If the
F-sharp is in the background in that sort of perception, then in
order to get clearer about such musical subtleties, we had
better find a way of describing it.
5. Merleau-Ponty on perceptual indeterminacy
I want to work up to offering a characterization of the
background features as perceptually indeterminate, in
Merleau-Ponty's sense.  We should begin by noting that, along
with Edmund Husserl, Merleau-Ponty maintains that when I
see a house (say) I see it as a three-dimensional object, even
though my perception is perspectival.  However, whereas
Husserl holds that I hypothesize the parts of the house that I
do not see, such as the back of the house, Merleau-Ponty
maintains that I actually experience the sides of the house
that are not determinately presented to me in perception.
 Here, I am following Sean D. Kelly's account of the distinction
between these philosophers on this notion of "object
transcendence."[14]  Kelly writes, "Merleau-Ponty ... thinks
that my current visual experience contains something that is
itself an indeterminate presentation of the back [-side of the
house]."[15]  In Merleau-Ponty's words, "The region
surrounding the visual field is not easy to describe, but what is
certain is that it is neither black nor grey.  There occurs here
an indeterminate vision, a vision of I do not know what, and,
to take the extreme case, what is behind my back is not
without some element of visual presence" (PoP, p.
6).[16]         
Merleau-Ponty's notion of indeterminacy does not have to do
only with that which is hidden.  In fact, as Kelly writes, "The
canonical kind of indeterminate visual presence, for Merleau-
Ponty, is the visual presence of the background against which
a figure appears.  The background, insofar as it is experienced
as a background, is visually present to a subject even though
it makes no determinate contribution to his experience."[17]
 Kelly argues that the indeterminacy of a background feature
(say, the relative brightness of a light) consists in its
normative effect; "the experience of the lighting context is
essentially normative; I see how the lighting should change in
order for me to see the color better."[18]  I will not follow
Kelly to this normative claim; rather, I focus on the positive
effects of indeterminate features vis-à-vis related emergent
perceptual qualities, and I will draw support directly from
Merleau-Ponty's texts, beginning with this important claim:
 "We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive
phenomenon.  Quality appears within this atmosphere" (PoP,
p. 7).  Notice that while Dennett does not acknowledge the
difference between the way features show up in the
background versus how they show up as objects of attention,
Merleau-Ponty is focused on just this distinction.            
Consider what Merleau-Ponty says about the Müller-Lyer lines
(figure 2).  The horizontal lines are, of course, the same
length, but they appear to be different lengths in the Müller-
Lyer context. Merleau-Ponty claims that the horizontal lines
are indeterminate in a normal perception of the illusion. Now,
if we focus on each of the horizontal lines, so as to extract
them from their context (ushering them into the figure role),
then we can see that the two lines are actually equal in length;
Merleau-Ponty takes this to be an unnatural way to view the
illusion.  If we perceive the illusion normally, by not
scrutinizing the horizontal lines, the horizontal lines do not look
equal.  Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty says that they also do not
look unequal.  In addition to the ordinary distinction between
looking equal and unequal, he is suggesting a third option.  He
says the lines look different. This third option will turn out to
be perceptual indeterminacy.
 
         Figure 2: Müller-Lyer lines          
Describing the way these horizontal lines look in a typical
perception of the illusion is to describe them neither as equal
nor unequal.  A perceived horizontal line in isolation (when it is
the object of attention, the figure) possesses characteristics
that a perceived line in this context does not (that is, with the
addition of auxiliary lines, when it is not in the figure role).
 Therefore, in describing such an indeterminate perceptual
feature, we will be mistaken if we characterize it as having the
kind of determinate specificity that can ground qualities such
as sameness or difference in length.  If we take determinate
length to be a characteristic of these lines in this context (even
determinate unequal length), we mischaracterize them.  This is
what Merleau-Ponty is getting at when he writes, "The lines in
Müller-Lyer's illusion cease to be equal without thereby
becoming 'unequal'—they become 'different'" (PoP, p.
11).           
With regard to length, then, the Müller-Lyer lines are
perceived as ambiguous.  What I want to emphasize is that
this perceptual ambiguity is a perceptual-interpretive resting
place; the ambiguity is preserved.  By allowing the lines to
remain ambiguous in perception, the illusion is generated.
Contributing to, or fostering, the illusion is the positive
influence of the indeterminate features that Merleau-Ponty is
referring to.  We ought to allow such indeterminate features to
have this positive influence without seeking to render them
determinate.  Such indeterminate features are not ambiguities
to be clarified; indeed, if our goal is to correctly describe such
an experience, we must not give a description of these
features as clarified.  We must not clarify indeterminate
features because this would mischaracterize their role in the
experience.           
What I have been driving at is that the examples of musical
subtleties I have mentioned are analogous to the Müller-Lyer
lines:  the overtones in Dennett's first perception of the E-
string are fruitfully described as indeterminate in Merleau-
Ponty's sense.  They made a positive contribution to the E-
string sound, and they made this contribution as ambiguous.
 In an ordinary perception of the E-string their ambiguity is
preserved.  Dennett treats this ambiguity as a kind of
summoning (in Plato's sense [19]); Dennett sought to clarify
the overtones, and as we have seen, the overtones became
the figure; they became determinate in subsequent
perceptions.           
Dennett's approach covers over a distinction between
perceptions that becomes crucial in aesthetic experience.  To
see why, consider the example of the "brightening" that is
brought on by the slightly raised F-sharp.  I want to suggest
that the F-sharp is perceptually indeterminate in an ordinary
perception of this subtlety.  Mull over this question:  when one
focuses upon the flute's raised F-sharp (noting that it is
slightly high)—in that precise moment—does the quality of
"brightening" emerge in experience?  If this example is
sufficiently analogous to the Müller-Lyer lines, then the
"brightening" will not arise unless the F-sharp is perceived as
indeterminate, preserved as ambiguous; one cannot hear the
F-sharp as an "F-sharp(5)" (say) and hear the "brightening" at
the same exact moment.[20]        
My claim does not rely upon an analogy to the Müller-Lyer
illusion alone; Merleau-Ponty makes this point more generally:
some elements of a perception perform a function as
indeterminate background features that they would not
perform were they to be perceived as the figure,
determinately.  Consider another example raised by Merleau-
Ponty that concerns the perceptual effect of the reflection on
human eyes.  (Merleau-Ponty is ultimately making a point
about perceiving actual human eyes, but he makes the point
by referring to techniques of painting.)
It took centuries of painting before the reflections
upon the eye were seen, without which the
painting remains lifeless and blind, as in the
paintings by primitive peoples.  The reflection is
not seen for itself, since it was able to go
unnoticed for so long, and yet it has its function
in perception, since its mere absence is enough
to remove the life and the expression from
objects and from faces. (PoP, p. 322)
The perceptual effect of the reflection on the eye is to give the
face life and expression.  What Merleau-Ponty says next is
based upon the idea that there are different ways of perceiving
this reflection.  "The reflection is only seen out of the corner of
the eye.  It is not presented as an aim of our perception; it is
the auxiliary or the mediator of our perception.  It is not itself
seen, but makes the rest be seen" (PoP, pp. 322-323).  The
idea is that we can perceive an eye-reflection either as a
figure (an object of attention:  "an aim of our perception") or
as in the background ("out of the corner of the eye").  The
reflection makes an important contribution to our perception of
life and expression in a face; namely, it mediates that
perception; seeing an eye-reflection indeterminately fosters
our perception of the life and expression in a face.
 Importantly, the reflection—as well as other background
features such as lighting—would not have the effects they do
were they not perceived indeterminately:  "Lighting and
reflection only play their role if they fade into the background
as discreet intermediaries, and if they direct our gaze rather
than arresting it" (PoP, 323, emphasis in original).
6. Subtleties of duration:  groove
Consider another musical example, a musical subtlety of
duration.  Ringo Starr's manner of playing various rhythmic
patterns in early Beatles' recordings, such as "All My Lovin',"
makes the rhythms "feel" as though they "lean" forward or
"push."  This forward-leaning quality of his performances is
one kind of groove (which, generally speaking, is the "feel" of
a rhythm).  In contrast, the grooves of Led Zeppelin's John
Bonham tend to "lean backward"; for example, the groove on
"Blackdog" is backward-leaning.  The way these drum
performances sound—the "feel" around which the other
musical elements coalesce—is not merely a matter of the
rhythmic patterns.  Of the elements that contribute to Ringo's
grooves, timing nuances are the most crucial; Ringo strikes
certain notes slightly early; similarly, by striking certain notes
slightly late, John Bonham makes the rhythm "feel" as though
it is leaning backward.  Leaving these particular examples
behind, consider a particular kind of rhythmic pattern, a swing.
 The ride cymbal element of a swing rhythm is shown in figure
3.  In performing a swing so that it feels as though it leans
backward, a drummer strikes certain eighth notes late; the
notes that are struck late are represented in figure 4 with
arrows.  This backward-leaning groove is extremely common
in jazz; for example, in the Count Basie Band's drummer
Sonny Payne's performance on "Fly Me to the Moon (in Other
Words)."[21]
 
Figure 3:  The ride cymbal element of a swing rhythm
Figure 4:  Ride element with slightly late notes indicated
Now, consider the perception in which the backward-leaning
quality of the groove is the figure; this is an ordinary
experience.  Drummers play these notes slightly late primarily
so that other musicians and listeners experience this rhythmic
"feel," not primarily so that other musicians and listeners
notice that this strike is slightly later than the ordinary eighth
note, and so on.  On the grounds outlined above in relation to
pitch, I want to suggest that the slightly late eighth notes that
generate the backward-leaning groove are not perceived
determinately in that experience. In an ordinary perception,
they do not show up in a way such that they could accurately
be described as "eighth note(-3)" or "eighth note(-5)."
 Rather, their specific duration is not perceived.  In the
moment during which one focuses upon the late eighth notes,
when they become the figure, in that precise moment, the
backward-leaning quality drops out of the experience.  This
claim rests not only upon an analogy to Merleau-Ponty's
account of the Müller-Lyer lines but also his description and
general claims about the perception of background features
discussed above, such as reflections, lighting, and so on.         
It may help to consider a visual analog.  In his Cézanne:  A
Study of His Development,[22] Roger Fry discusses one of
Paul Cézanne's portraits of his wife, "Madame Cézanne in a
Red Dress" (1888-1890).[23]  Fry mentions three aspects of
the painting.  First, the portrait is boldly symmetrical; the
model is facing forward, nearly centered, her arms are at her
sides, the chair is rigidly rectangular, and so on.  But second,
Fry emphasizes that, in spite of the straightforward,
symmetrical design, the painting possesses a certain "vitality .
. . . the palpitation of life."[24]  I believe that such a vital
quality, an emergent Gestalt quality, is analogous to a musical
groove.  Third, Fry seems to understand this vitality as being
due to the slight variations of various elements of the painting.
Cézanne has instinctively corrected this [plain
symmetry of design] in his detailed treatment.
Everywhere this symmetry is modified by
deformations:  the body leans slightly to one
side, and the perpendicular of the dado behind
becomes drawn into the movement . . . . The
strongly marked edge of the dado seen in
perspective affords by its emphasis the
counterpoise to these uniform movements.
Finally, as though not to break anywhere this
general play of slight variations, this dado does
not even keep a continuous line, but appears as
though refracted where it passes behind the
chair.[25]
Fry notes that the out of kilter dado was no mistake. Indeed,
two additional portraits of Cézanne's wife, which Fry does not
mention, also include an out of kilter dado / baseboard:
"Madame Cézanne in a Yellow Chair" (1888-1890)[26] and
"Madame Cézanne with Green Hat" (1891-1892).[27]  In all
three of these paintings, an edge of the room's dado /
baseboard passes behind the chair but is out of kilter; the
edge that we see emerging from one side of the chair does not
line up with the edge emerging from the other side.  I want to
suggest that the out of kilter edges are analogous to the early
or late eighth notes of a groove.  "Madame Cézanne with
Green Hat" possesses not only a vital quality but also a quality
of movement.  I am suggesting that, in all three of these
paintings, the out of kilter edges mediate or foster emergent
qualities of vitality or movement.
The relevant question for us to ask is whether, in the precise
moments during which one scrutinizes the out of kilter
elements, one perceives the quality of movement or vitality. 
By analogy to the examples above, such as the reflections in
eyes, my claim is that we do not perceive the movement or
vitality; we only experience these emergent qualities in the
moments in which we allow the out of kilter elements to
remain in the background as indeterminate elements,
preserving their ambiguity in perception so that they can
function to mediate the emergence of the quality of movement
or vitality.  Characterizing such elements as indeterminate in
Merleau-Ponty's sense is an effective way of describing them
while they are in the perceptual background.  This conclusion
can also serve as a practical suggestion regarding active
aesthetic experience:  one effective way to attempt to
perceive emergent qualities such as a groove, a harmonic
brightening, or a visual quality of vitality or movement, is to
allow the background, contributing elements to remain
ambiguous in perception.
7. Conclusion
I have claimed that describing perceptual experiences of
musical subtleties by characterizing all of the relevant
elements as they show up when they are objects of attention
(as occupying the figure role) leads to inaccurate descriptions.
 The background features of some musical subtleties—for
example, a slightly high F-sharp, late eighth notes, or an E-
String's overtones—are typically not determinately perceived. 
Support for these claims is drawn from my criticism of
Dennett's analysis, claims about what is typical in musical
experiences, as well as analogies to claims Merleau-Ponty
makes about certain visual experiences.  I have claimed that a
promising option is to characterize background features as
indeterminate in Merleau-Ponty's sense; such features perform
a positive function, according to Merleau-Ponty, insofar as they
mediate emergent qualities; I suggest that grooves,
brightened harmonies, and so on, are examples of such
emergent qualities.  Performing this positive function requires
that these features be preserved as ambiguous in perception.
 Support for this last claim rests on Merleau-Ponty's claims
about the Müller-Lyer lines as well as background features
such as lighting and reflection.          
A benefit of adopting my suggestions is that we can avoid
descriptions of musical subtleties that are too coarse-grained,
which fail to capture differences among perceptions (like
Dennett's), while also avoiding the conclusion that such
subtleties are ineffable (Raffman's claim).  Regarding the
latter, first, as I suggested in "Musical Musical Nuance," we
can render subtleties effable by (1) describing nonstructural
effects of slight variations of pitch or duration (such as a
"brightened" chord) via metaphor and comparison.  And as I
have argued above, we can make further progress by (2)
describing the perceptions in terms of the figure-ground
structure, where the effects occupy the figure role, and slightly
high pitches (etc.) are a part of the background; and (3) by
clarifying how the background features show up and function
in experience in terms of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of
perceptual indeterminacy and their mediating function.[28]
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